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Abstract Agent-based simulations and human-subject experiments explore the
emergence of respect for property in a specialization and exchange economy with
costless theft. Software agents, driven by reciprocity and hill-climbing heuristics and
parameterized to replicate humans when property is exogenously protected, are em-
ployed to predict human behavior when property can be freely appropriated. Agents
do not predict human behavior in a new set of experiments because subjects innovate,
constructing a property convention of “mutual taking” in 5 out of the 6 experimen-
tal sessions that allows exchange to crowd out theft. When the same convention is
made available to agents, they adopt it and again replicate human behavior. Property
emerges as a social convention that exploits the capacity for reciprocity to sustain
trade.
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1 Introduction
Property is the glue that holds together an economy based on exchange. For two
agents to engage in mutually beneficial trade, it is assumed that each has a right
to determine the fate of the goods and services being exchanged. Parties to an ex-
change rely on the presumption that their counterpart will neither renege on a par-
tially completed transaction nor obviate the need for exchange by forcibly taking the
desired goods. Such observations, while perhaps obvious, can be considered trivial
only if one does not reflect on the fragility of property and the ease with which it can
be violated by sufficiently motivated groups or individuals. The range of violations
stretches from the historical predations of Viking marauders to lowly pickpockets in
crowded subway stations, and property has always been precarious to a greater or
lesser degree. How, then, does the respect for property emerge in order to facilitate
specialization and trade? This paper seeks to answer that question with a combination
of human-subject experiments and agent-based models. When subjects (or computer-
ized agents) are placed in an environment with imperfect property protection, how do
they come to respect one another’s possessions in order to reap the gains from trade?
Kimbrough (forthcoming) develops an agent-based model of the two-good pro-
duction and exchange economy of Crockett et al. (2009, hereafter CSW) to make
concrete the dynamics and behavioral rules that guide subjects to discover (or fail to
discover) specialization and trade. Hill-climbing and reciprocity heuristics are consis-
tent with the varieties of human behavior in the original CSW environment and pre-
dict behavior under environmental variations with exogenous property enforcement.
As Kimbrough argues, if agents’ decision rules yield model output that is accurate in
its depiction of human behavior in one environment, a valid model should predict hu-
man behavior in additional environments.1 Hence this paper asks whether a calibrated
agent-based model populated with heuristic-driven agents predicts human-subject be-
havior in a new set of experiments in which property is not exogenously protected.
This interplay between laboratory experiments and agent-based models offers an
important method of testing behavioral explanations of economic outcomes because
creating agents requires specifying detailed decision rules for which simulated inter-
actions with an economic environment constitute predictions about human behavior.
Many behavioral explanations from psychology, neuroscience and other disciplines
can be compared by first formulating them as decision rules for computerized agents
and then asking whether agents employing these rules in a given environment are able
to predict human behavior in that same environment. Feedback from comparisons to
additional human-subject data facilitates refinement of the decision model and may
suggest additional experimental treatments necessary to settle disputes.2
1Arthur (1991) offers an early agent-based model that replicates human decisions in a simple, two-choice
bandit experiment, but the degrees of freedom in programming a model make it relatively trivial (given
enough time) to replicate human subject data. If a model is required also to make out-of-sample predictions
under environmental variations, then the generality of the underlying decision rules can be better estab-
lished. See Duffy (2001) and Arifovic and Ledyard (2004) for other implementations of this methodology.
2Recourse to additional data is essential to the validation of any simulation model. As Kimbrough
(forthcoming) argues, “[Frequently, simulation] studies are subjected to the criticism that many sets of
decision rules can yield equivalent behavioral outcomes; that is, although a given set of rules yields life-
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My agents operate by applying proven hill-climbing and reciprocity heuristics to
discover trade and the benefits of specialization, and these same principles guide
their discovery of theft and their decisions about whether to steal or trade. Since
these general behavioral motivations are sufficient to characterize human behavior in
discovering and implementing trade, I hypothesize that they should also be sufficient
to predict human subjects’ implementation of theft. Surprisingly, agents employing
these heuristics alone fail to predict human behavior in the new imperfect property en-
forcement environment; the simple model paints too bleak a picture and predicts de-
generation of specialization and exchange as theft crowds out cooperation. Instead of
abandoning trade, human subjects innovate to construct a novel property arrangement
that facilitates exchange and specialization. They exploit the absence of property pro-
tection to develop a second method of trading (consensual taking, or “steal trading”)
reflected in a specific property convention that emerges in five of six sessions. How-
ever, when the potential to adopt that convention (also guided by reciprocity) is added
to agents’ behavioral repertoire, they again replicate human behavior.
Subject behavior highlights the importance of shared beliefs and the creation of
conventions to support exchange. The social interpretation of the act of taking goods
from another individual depends powerfully on the conventions in which the act is
embedded. Thus, what is interpreted as theft in one case is interpreted as one-half
of an exchange agreement under a different property convention. The results suggest
that in open-ended environments, an accurate decision-model will require the intro-
duction of agents that form beliefs about the beliefs of others and seek to coordinate
those beliefs to form conventions that provide consistent interpretation of actions
taken. In the case of property, agents would develop beliefs about which takings con-
stitute violations of property, and then their behavioral heuristics would guide them
to develop respect for property (or not) under the chosen interpretation.
Section 2 describes the economic environment and the design as well as results
from the model developed in Kimbrough (forthcoming). Section 3 details the notion
of property as a convention. Section 4 explains how possibilities for theft and the
emergence of property are added to the Kimbrough model and compares the new,
imperfect property protection model to the original to define hypotheses for a set of
new human subject experiments. Section 5 describes the results of the experiments
and compares them to the model predictions. Section 6 details a third version of
model as updated by observations from the experiments, and Sect. 7 concludes and
summarizes the findings.
2 Simulation and experimental environment
2.1 The economic environment
The underlying economic environment in these simulations and experiments is de-
scribed in detail in CSW, Kimbrough et al. (2010), and Kimbrough, and all the same
features are retained here. Subjects (and agents) are assigned one of two types, odd
like outcomes, this does not imply that outcomes in the real world are generated by the same (or similar)
process.” To establish the validity of the model, it must be able to make out-of-sample predictions.
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and even. These types define production functions with increasing returns to one of
two goods and Leontief preferences over the goods, with a stronger preference for
the good in which they possess increasing returns to specialization. In each trading
period, subjects choose a rate of specialization that defines the proportion of their
time budgets they will spend producing each good. Subjects know the form of their
preferences, but are given no information about their production function except what
they discover by experimentation.
Goods appear in subjects’ “fields” as they are produced and must be moved by
pointing and clicking with a mouse into “homes” in order to be consumed. On each
home and field is displayed the number of each good therein, so subjects can observe
production and consumption behavior of other subjects. CSW fully protect property
in all goods in subjects’ homes and fields; that is, no one can take goods from another
person at any time. Subjects may exchange by moving goods to other subjects’ homes
and fields, but the instructions do not inform them of this possibility. Over 35 trading
periods of 90 seconds each, subjects learn (or not) to specialize and exchange by trial
and error and via communication in a shared chat room. Fully specialized odd (even)
subjects can earn 90 (80) cents per period if they specialize completely and trade
with a suitably specialized partner of the opposite type. Subjects working in autarky
can maximally earn roughly 1/3 of what they can earn by trading. Hence there are
strong incentives to implement specialization and exchange if the possibilities are
recognized.
2.2 Learning to specialize and trade
The economic environment in CSW was developed to highlight the discovery process
by which individuals implement welfare-improving specialization and exchange. The
theoretical apparatus of economics frequently assumes away questions about the
sources of discovery (i.e. agents already have perfect information, technology of pro-
duction is given, etc.), and CSW sought to emphasize the fact that while opportunities
to gain from exchange are ubiquitous, there is no reason to assume that such possibil-
ities are immediately known or easily inferred. Indeed some individuals and groups
are very successful at discovering and implementing trade in their environment, while
others lag behind. Furthermore, the rate of success depends crucially on how groups
are formed. CSW observe that it is critical to the regular discovery of specialization
and trade that each subject find a suitable trading partner. Large groups, formed all
at once, are too chaotic for individuals to find suitable trading partners and reap the
gains from trade, but when subjects begin the experiments in pairs and are slowly
merged into a larger group (the “Build” treatment), these problems are mitigated and
large groups are able to develop and sustain specialization and exchange.
In Kimbrough (forthcoming), the author designs simulated agents to replicate
human behavior in CSW’s baseline, single large group environment, and then asks
how well the simulation model predicts behavior in the sessions in which the groups
were built from smaller groups. Model details are included in Appendix A in elec-
tronic supplementary material. Like the original CSW experiments, the simulations
are performed exactly as in the original model; the only change is the manner in
which groups form. Figure 1 below compares rates of efficiency in the simulations
of Kimbrough to that of the human subjects in CSW. Figure 1(a) displays efficiency
88 E.O. Kimbrough
Fig. 1 Average efficiency by session (group) and week—CSW experiments and Kimbrough simulations
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Fig. 1 (continued)
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over the course of each session of CSW’s baseline experiments (averaged over six
“weeks” and ranked by efficiency), and Fig. 1(b) displays the average simulation
efficiency for 6 blocks of 300 simulation runs of one characteristic parameteriza-
tion of the model, grouped by final period efficiency.3 As reported in Kimbrough,
95% confidence intervals of mean efficiency from the simulation output contain the
mean of human subject data, and 100,000 Wilcoxon tests comparing random sam-
ples of 6 simulated sessions to the 6 experimental sessions reject the null hypothesis
of equal mean efficiency in more than 5% of tests only in early periods. Figure 1(c)
displays efficiency data from CSW’s 10 “Build” sessions, and Fig. 1(d) displays the
same data from a single parameterization of Kimbrough’s Build simulations, dis-
played in 10 blocks of 180 simulations, again ordered by final period efficiency. For
a slightly restricted parameter space, the simulation model still replicates CSW’s ob-
servations.
The simulations account for human behavior not in terms of the equilibrium prop-
erties of the system as a whole but rather via heuristic decision rules based on ob-
served behavior in the experimental environment. While simulated agents are unable
to communicate via chat room like the human subjects (I have not, nor could I have,
endowed them with the ability), the simulations abstract from the social aspect of
chat room exchange, instead modeling the reciprocity heuristics underlying such ex-
changes. These heuristics identify the process by which exchanges (economic and
social) are transmitted into behavior in the experimental sessions. As the author ar-
gues:
Basing a model on a controlled experiment (. . .) allows precise calibration to
observable human behavior. In designing experiments, economists induce pref-
erences (Smith 1974, 1982) and production functions, and behavior is bounded
and directly recorded. Clear benchmarks exist for optimal behavior, and the
process by which subjects achieve, or fail to achieve, optimality is readily ob-
served. The additional detail in data afforded by experiments means that ob-
served data can be readily mapped to agent-level decision rules, and because
additional controlled experiments can be performed, the agent-based model can
be verified by using it to make predictions about a new experimental environ-
ment. If the agents’ decision rules yield model output that is accurate in its
depiction of human behavior in one environment, the model should be a good
predictor of human behavior in other environments. (Kimbrough forthcoming)
The agents employ simple hill-climbing and reinforcement learning heuristics to
grope over the production space and develop trading relationships, and the predictive
(or replicative) power of these heuristics is robust to an exogenous change in the way
groups form in this environment. The next step, then, is to ask whether these agents
and the heuristic principles driving their behavior can account for the emergence of
other phenomena, namely respect for property.
3The parameters chosen for this figure are representative of output from a broad range of parameter
choices. See Kimbrough (forthcoming).
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3 Property as a convention
As Hume (2000) describes the origins of property, “It is only a general sense of
common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another,
and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it
will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he
will act in the same manner with regard to me” (1740, pp. 314–315). Many societies
have developed complex mechanisms to punish violators of such rules, and in general,
students of property have focused on the creation of enforcement mechanisms when
attempting to account for property’s origin.4 However, an account of enforcement
institutions is not an account of the emergence of property, for any use of enforcement
implies that property has already been violated. Punishment may satisfy a need for
retribution (Levine 1998) or incentivize future adherence to a norm or convention
(Fehr and Gachter 2000; Bernhard et al. 2006), but both of those hypotheses about
the purpose of punishment imply the prior existence of some rule, the violation of
which merits punishment. The question remains how to account for the emergence of
this original rule and to explain how that emergence can be observed in experimental
and agent-based environments. When we consider that the original rule is of the form
of a convention as described by Hume, the explanation becomes clearer. In the case
of property, the convention may consist of deciding to trade rather than to take in
order to augment one’s consumption, but this will only be successful provided other
agents have adopted the same rule.
Young (1993, 1996) details the game-theoretic emergence of such conventions
(by his definition, convergence to a single equilibrium when many exist) among
boundedly-rational agents for a broad class of games. Repeated interactions may
(by chance) give an edge to a particular strategy creating a positive feedback loop
whereby agents employing that strategy are more successful than others, and the
more agents employ the strategy, the more successful it becomes. In relatively sim-
ple agent-based models of games such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the stag hunt,
it has been demonstrated that naïve agents can converge on simple conventions
that come to pervade a population through replicator dynamics (virtual natural se-
lection) or by the epidemiological transmission of behavioral rules (Axelrod 1997;
Skyrms 2004). Here I seek to explore the emergence of property conventions in a
complex specialization and trade environment, and it will be important to have crite-
ria by which to judge whether a convention has emerged.
Kimbrough et al. (2010, hereafter KSW) explore CSW’s Build environment in
the absence of exogenous property protection. They alter the CSW environment by
eliminating exogenous restrictions on who may view and click on the content of
subjects’ homes and fields, and they compare various costly enforcement mech-
anisms to a baseline in which only moral suasion may be used to enforce one’s
claims. Surprisingly, they find little evidence (1) that a lack of exogenous enforce-
ment reduces efficiency (because some sessions are cooperative without it) and (2)
that their mechanisms make subjects better off. In fact, the mechanisms are far
4Ranging from Bentham (1802) and Westermarck (1908) to Wyman (2005) and Levine (2005) accounts
of property’s origin have focused on the legal aspects of property and the explicit recognition of rights.
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more likely to do harm through costly retaliation. KSW argue that the relative ef-
ficiency of these regimes results from socially created, informal property conven-
tions.
Following Hume (2000), who wrote that “property is nothing but a stable pos-
session, derived from the rules of justice, or the conventions of men” (1740,
pp. 324–325), KSW define property empirically as an agreement or convention (ei-
ther implicit or explicit) that creates stable possession in their experimental environ-
ment. They argue that although property, rooted in convention and observable only
in its effects, may not exhibit the traits commonly associated with property rights in
the folk wisdom (e.g. enforceable contracts, explicit punishment mechanisms, or ar-
bitration), the fundamental fact of property is that it implies the absence of unwanted
appropriations of goods. Property, like money, is a self-referential social practice – it
can only be explained by reference to itself.5 Thus, property emerges empirically as
the absence of undesired unilateral takings.6 This is crucial because this definition
of property permits observing the endogenous emergence of an institution in both
experiments and agent-based models. With agents, as with human subjects, to under-
stand how respect for property emerges, one must understand what behavioral rules
and what sorts of interactions lead to a cessation of takings.
Kimbrough’s agents employ simple heuristic learning methods derived from direct
observation of the social and economic interaction of human subjects and are able to
replicate and predict subjects’ propensity to discover and exploit specialization and
trade. Agents employing rules of reinforcement learning reciprocity in exchange and
trial-and-error, hill-climbing in specialization capture the variety of human behav-
iors in CSW’s experimental environment. My simulation builds upon this research
to model how agents develop (or fail to develop) property conventions to support
exchange. I hypothesize that a model that extends these heuristics to the process by
which agents choose to either take or trade will predict human-subject behavior in
attempting to solve the same social problem.7
While KSW have previously performed other human-subject experiments with
imperfect property enforcement, the Build environment they employed was designed
specifically to increase the social cohesion of the group—hence, perhaps, the relative
success of subjects in their environment. Here, I will ask how agents perform when
they interact in groups of eight from the outset, creating an opportunity to test the
model against a new set of experiments.
5Bloor (2002) explains this as follows: a metal disc is a coin only in the context of money. Without a con-
ventional notion of what it means for a disc to be a coin—embodied in its use to complete transactions—a
metal disc would not be money. It would merely be a metal disc. In the same vein, what is property if oth-
ers freely expropriate it? Howitt and Clower (2000) develop an agent-based model that yields an emergent
market economy with universal adoption of commodity money.
6As a referee points out, to use “theft” here instead of “undesired unilateral takings” would mean to assume
the existence of the institution this paper seeks to explain. A unilateral taking is only a “theft” if interpreted
as such, and this point will become all the clearer in the results below.
7The ability to make out-of-sample predictions is the validation criteria for any model.
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4 Extending the model and simulation results
4.1 Implementing theft
The underlying simulation model in this no property protection environment is ex-
actly the same as that described in Kimbrough (forthcoming). Agents explore their
economic environment incrementally, learning specialization and exchange via hill-
climbing and reinforcement-learning (reciprocity). The sole change is the addition of
a function that permits agents to take goods from other agents unilaterally and with-
out engaging in trade. Hereafter, such takings are referred to as “theft”, and the new
model will be referred to as the T -model. The following pseudocode gives a general





Begin Loop Over Periods
Begin Period
Loop 1—Production and Trading Partner Selection
Loop 2—Theft and Update Theft Probabilities
Loop 3—Autarkic Consumption
Loop 4—Trade and Update Trade Probability
Loop 5—Update Learning, Specialization, and Willingness to Trade
End Period
Record Data
End Loop Over Periods
To introduce theft, it must be determined, first, whether each agent will steal; sec-
ond, from whom agents that choose to engage in theft will steal; third, what impact
this has on agents who are stolen from; and fourth, what rules might allow some sets
of agents to overcome theft and develop respect for property. In general, the initial
probability of theft should be non-zero and in some manner based on empirical data;
being stolen from should incite retaliation; and, following Hume’s notion that con-
ventions emerge conditionally, agents should have some chance of crowding out theft
via mutually beneficial trade.
Keeping those considerations in mind, theft in the model operates as follows.
Agents are initialized either with or without a propensity to steal. Then, with some
probability each agent with a propensity to theft will actually steal and will acquire
all the goods produced by their target agent. Agents who are stolen from, even those
with no initial propensity to steal, will become more likely to steal in the future and
will direct their future thieving efforts at those who have stolen from them. On the
other hand, to offset and potentially crowd out theft, trade relationships will diminish
the future probabilities of theft and heal the cracks in inter-agent relationships. Theft
occurs after production, but before consumption and exchange. The operational de-
tails of the extended model follow.
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4.1.1 Deciding who steals
As stated above, it is important that a randomly-instantiated agent’s initial probability
of theft be based in some way on empirical data. Some subjects in KSW’s experimen-
tal treatments begin to steal goods from others almost immediately; others only begin
to steal once they’ve been stolen from; and some never steal at all. As a heuristic with
which to construct the agents, I employ the likelihood that an experimental subject
engages in theft before using the chat room in an attempt to communicate. This seems
a reasonable choice for two reasons.
First, given that their subjects are explicitly made aware of the chat room and
must actually experiment with the interface to learn that theft is possible, such be-
havior suggests something about a subject’s approach to the task. Second, subjects
from KSW who talk before stealing earn, on average, $0.11 (roughly 33%) more per
period than those who steal before talking, suggesting that the heuristic is useful for
categorizing experimental subjects. Thus, because 118 of the 192 subjects in the var-
ious treatments of KSW engage in theft before they attempt to communicate, each
agent i is instantiated with a variable thief i{0,0.3} with Pi(thief = 0.3) = 118/192,
meaning that roughly 60% of agents will attempt to steal in the first period of the
simulation. I choose 0.3 because it is roughly equal to one divided by the average
period in which KSW’s experimental subjects first engage in theft.8 Thus, of the 60%
of agents that attempt to steal, on average 30% will actually steal in the first period
of a simulation.
After instantiation, any time an agent is targeted for theft, thief i is incremented by
a value called stealProbabilityIncrement to increase the probability of future theft.9
Furthermore, if an agent has thief i = 0, being stolen from increments this variable
and adds another potential thief to the population. On the other hand, any time an
agent i engages in trade with another agent j , both thief i and thief j are decremented
by 2 × stealProbabilityIncrement to reduce the probability of future theft. The idea
is that agents will engage in both positive and negative reciprocity, but that agents
are more sensitive to the opportunity to forgive past wrongs for the prospect of future
benefits.10 Thus, it is possible that all agents will see their probabilities of theft fall
to 0 if enough trade occurs.
4.1.2 Rules to determine a thief’s target
As in the case of trade, each agent i stores a discrete probability distribution Si,j
specifying the likelihood of agent i stealing from each other agent j in I. In each
period, those agents for which thief > 0 make a random draw, z, from a uniform[0,1]
8It is clear that an increase in this value will lead to an increase in theft and a diminishing of cooperation,
so the initial value of this parameter is not systematically varied in the simulations described below.
9I fix the value of stealProbabilityIncrement at 0.1 for all reported T -model simulations.
10The double impact of cooperation is partly a practical attempt to “give peace a chance” because theft is
much easier than trade in the model. It only takes one person to steal, but for a trade to occur two agents
must each select the other as a trading partner. The notion that people tend to be forgiving for the prospect
of gains is based on subjective observation of human behavior in the CSW and KSW experiments, but the
rule could be adjusted to examine its impact.
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distribution and compare it to thief . If zi < thief i , agent i will choose a target j
from the set of other agents with probability Si,j . Thus, each agent j will be cho-
sen as the target of theft by agent i with probability = thief i × Si,j . In the first pe-
riod, for any agent with thief > 0, Si,A = Si,B = · · · = Si,j, and Si,i = 0 for each
agent, and for any agent with thief = 0, Si,A = Si,B = · · · = Si,j, = Si,i = 0. These
probabilities are altered over the course of the simulation by the following process:
(1) if agent B steals from agent A, SA,B is incremented by stealProbabilityIncre-
ment, augmenting the probability that A returns the favor and steals from agent
B in the future; and (2) if agent A trades with Agent C, SA,C is decremented by
2 × stealProbabilityIncrement.11 Note the similarity of these effects to that on the
probability of theft in general.
4.1.3 What happens to stolen goods?
Recall that all theft decisions occur prior to the consumption and exchange portions of
the model. Once an agent elects to steal from another agent, that agent takes all of the
target agent’s goods and treats them as his own for consumption and trade purposes.
In the experimental environment, subjects may steal from as many other subjects
as they like, but they are potentially limited in their effectiveness by the prospect of
real-time retaliation. Because in the agent-based version of the environment presented
here theft must happen sequentially and not in real-time, and because theft may be
cumulative (i.e. if A steals from B and then C steals from A, C acquires both A’s and
B’s goods), I randomize the order of theft in each period. Furthermore, I allow agents
to steal from only one other agent.12 Thus, it is possible (if all agents are stealing,
and the ordering of theft is just right) that a single agent will end a period with all
of the goods produced by all agents in that period. It is also possible that an agent
will attempt to steal from an agent whose goods have already been stolen. This will
not contribute to the breakdown of cooperation (that is, it will not adjust any of the
relevant probabilities) because no actual goods change hands.
4.2 Simulation results and experimental hypotheses
I employ the six parameterizations from Kimbrough under the new T -model, and the
next section reports results on 1800 simulations of 35 periods each under each para-
meterization and compares these to the original No T -model. I compare the models
in terms of efficiency and specialization, and the data from the T -model form my hy-
potheses for the new experiments. Let πit denote the realized earnings of agent i in
period t and πai and π
c
i denote, respectively, expected earnings in autarky and at the







× 100%. And if qit denotes the total amount of goods produced by
11Si,j is bounded below by 0 due to logical constraints. I assume that agents have perfect memories, i.e.
that these probabilities do not fade over time.
12While this process does not model the human subject environment precisely, it captures the essential
features of theft in KSW’s experiments in that theft creates a zero-sum environment for the involved
parties.
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Table 1 Theft (T) treatments—parameters, efficiency and specialization
Treatment MinEarnAlone MinEarnTrade Efficiency Specialization
1015T 10 15 −11.44% 37.22%
1515T 15 15 −10.80% 37.48%
2015T 20 15 −10.36% 37.47%
1020T 10 20 −10.82% 37.22%
1520T 15 20 −10.34% 37.50%
2020T 20 20 −10.19% 37.53%
1015 10 15 2.83% 44.23%
1515 15 15 4.38% 42.93%
2015 20 15 4.28% 41.66%
1020 10 20 3.21% 43.72%
1520 15 20 3.53% 43.76%
2020 20 20 4.58% 41.99%
CSW NA NA 4.24% 44.49%
Theft NA NA 0.05% 50.24%
Italicized entries are from Kimbrough (forthcoming)
Bolded entries are human subject experiments
agent i in period t , and q¯i is the maximum amount of goods that agent i can produce





Table 1 below lists each of the six parameterizations of the T - and No T -models
and their average rates of efficiency and specialization as well as average efficiency
and specialization in the original eight-subject CSW experiments and the new Theft
experiments reported here. As expected, the introduction of theft to the model has
a strong negative impact on both efficiency and specialization. Average efficiency
is −10.66% in the T -model and 3.80% in the No T -model, and average rates of
specialization are 37.40% and 43.05%, respectively. Mann-Whitney tests confirm that
the differences are statistically significant.
Finding 1 The T -model simulations are significantly less efficient than the no-T
simulations in weeks 3 and 6.
Following CSW and KSW, each 35 trading-period simulation (and experiment) is
divided into 6 weeks. Week 3 efficiency measures the performance of each session
at the halfway point, and week 6 efficiency measures output by the end. Table 2
reports two-sided Mann Whitney Tests comparing each T -model parameterization to
its corresponding no-T model in both week 3 and week 6. These tests reject the null
hypothesis of equal mean efficiency for every parameterization; and the difference
in means suggests that efficiency is lower in the T -model. Additional, unreported
Mann-Whitney tests reject the null hypotheses of equal rates of specialization in week
3 or week 6 for all of the treatments. Goods are also produced at a significantly
lower rate with theft. As a robustness check, I also compare the T -model to the CSW
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Table 2 Two-sided Mann-Whitney results comparing efficiency of the theft (T ) and no-theft (no-T) sim-
ulations by treatment (1800 each)
Treatment Week 3 (efficiency) Week 6 (efficiency)
1015T U = 2689740* U = 2906682*
1515T U = 2880796* U = 3034669*
2015T U = 2976736* U = 3069754*
1020T U = 2920274* U = 2990344*
1520T U = 2897438* U = 2979198*
2020T U = 3017562* U = 3073506*
*Significant at = 0.001
Table 3 Strength of respect for property T -model (week 6)—number of sessions with perfect, strong, and
weak property
Treatment 1015T 1020T 1515T 1520T 2015T 2020T
Perfect (0%) 9 6 7 6 9 8
(0.5%) (0.33%) (0.39%) (0.33%) (0.5%) (0.44%)
Strong (<10%) 50 44 38 37 25 27
(2.78%) (2.44%) (2.11%) (2.06%) (1.39%) (1.5%)
Weak (<20%) 42 48 30 45 23 26
(2.33%) (2.67%) (1.67%) (2.5%) (1.28%) (1.44%)
Total 101 98 75 88 57 61
(5.61%) (5.44%) (4.17%) (4.89%) (3.17%) (3.39%)
experiments, under the hypothesis that the simulations will also be less efficient than
the experiments.
Understanding property as an emergent convention revealed by the absence of
theft, I define the strength of respect for property in a given period by the percentage
of agents that engage in theft. Then, I define three levels of property enforcement over
the final week of each simulation run. Simulation runs have perfect property when no
agent steals from another agent in the final week, strong property when less than 10%
of agents steal on average each day, and weak property when less than 20% of agents
steal on average each day.
Finding 2 By week 6, property is respected in only roughly 5% the simulations.
Table 3 reports the number of sessions (out of 1800) that display perfect, strong,
and weak respect for property in week 6 of each T -model parameterization. In only
two parameterizations does respect for property (the sum of perfect, strong and weak
runs) exceed 5%, with an average of 4.45%. The absence of exogenous protection of
property leads agents to steal from one another uncontrollably as theft begets retalia-
tion. The failure of reciprocity to create strong property conventions yields wasteful
inefficiency and diminishes the returns to specialization.
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I argue that the rules by which these computerized agents learn specialization, ex-
change, and theft constitute behavioral predictions about incremental learning and
the positive and negative feedback that result from economic interactions between
agents with limited rationality in a two-good production and exchange economy. The
decision heuristics were generated via rational reconstruction of observed human be-
havior and an iterative process aimed at calibrating behavioral parameters so that
agents would achieve outcomes commensurate with human behavior in an environ-
ment with exogenous property protection. By extending this model to a new envi-
ronment without property protection, I have created a set of predictions (under the
specified behavioral assumptions) whose validity can be tested by returning to the
laboratory. Together, the aforementioned findings form my hypotheses for the new
experiments. The Theft experiments will be indistinguishable from the T -model and
significantly less efficient than the CSW experiments due to the absence of effective
property protection.
5 Experimental treatment and results
5.1 The theft treatment
The new experimental treatment, which I call Theft, retains all preferences, produc-
tion functions, and instructions from the experiments described in CSW and Kim-
brough. Subjects must discover the possibility for exchange and specialization in
order to reap gains from trade. The only variation is that subjects may also, by explor-
ing the computer interface, engage in theft. Based on the results of the simulations, I
hypothesize that the absence of exogenous property enforcement will lead to a signif-
icant decrease in efficiency. Theft will hinder cooperation, diminishing specialization
and exchange and increasing waste.
Eight subjects were recruited at random from the undergraduate student body of
a private university in the United States to participate in each of 6 experimental ses-
sions. They sat at visually isolated computer terminals and read instructions from
the computer screen. Subjects received $7 for arriving to the experiment on time and
received their earnings in cash privately at the end of each 90-minute session. The
average experimental earnings were $9.69, ranging from a low of $0.48 to a high of
$23.71. No subject participated more than once, and no subject had prior experience
with a similar experimental environment. Instructions are included in an appendix in
electronic supplementary material.
5.2 Experimental results
Table 1 displays average efficiency and specialization over all six sessions of the Theft
treatment, and Fig. 2 displays average efficiency by week and average specialization
by day for each session. Note the high level of efficiency of Session 5 and also that
only one session shows negative efficiency in week 6. It appears that the absence
of exogenous property enforcement in this experimental environment does not have
nearly as powerful a negative effect on efficiency as the results of the simulations
suggest. In fact, by the end of session 5, it is more efficient than any CSW sessions!
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Fig. 2 Average efficiency by week and rate of specialization by day—Theft treatment
Finding 3a I cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal mean week 3 and week 6
efficiency for the Theft and CSW sessions.
Finding 3b Nor can I reject the null hypothesis of equal mean rates of specialization
in weeks 3 and 6 between the CSW sessions and the Theft sessions.
One-sided Mann-Whitney tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal mean
efficiency in both week 3 (U6,6 = 23, p-value = 0.24) and week 6 (U6,6 = 16, p-value
= 0.65) in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the Theft treatment is less efficient
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Table 4 95% bootstrapped
efficiency confidence
intervals—T -model vs. Theft
experiments (bolded entries do
not contain the Theft
experimental mean)
T -model Theft
Week 1 [−12.71,−9.37] −26.87
Week 2 [−13.54,−7.91] −12.72
Week 3 [−13.72,−6.07] −4.77
Week 4 [−14.00,−4.69] 8.87
Week 5 [−14.08,−3.70] 14.61
Week 6 [−13.96,−2.34] 21.17
than the CSW treatment. Thus, the hypothesis on relative efficiency generated by the
T -model can be rejected. Human subjects are able to reap gains from trade, even
when property rights are not exogenously enforced.
Furthermore, one-sided Mann-Whitney tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of
equal mean specialization in both week 3 (U6,6 = 13, p-value = 0.80) and week
6 (U6,6 = 11, p-value = 0.88) in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the Theft
means are lower. Thus, contrary to the simulated hypotheses, human subjects also
maintain relatively high rates of specialization in the face of insecure respect for
property.
By using the T -model to formulate hypotheses about the relationship between
the Theft and CSW treatments, I also create the subsidiary hypothesis that the T -
model will be indistinguishable from the Theft experiments. However, given that the
new experiments show no difference from the original, it is unsurprising that this
hypothesis also fails.
Finding 4 The T -model simulations are less efficient than the Theft experiments.
Table 4 reports bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals comparing average effi-
ciency in each week over all six parameterizations. The intervals are computed by
taking 100,000 samples of 6 T -model simulations each, from each treatment, and
then dropping the lowest and highest 2.5% of sample averages to find 95% confi-
dence limits for each week of each treatment. The average of the confidence limits
for a given week defines the simulation interval. The experimental mean is contained
in the confidence interval only in week 2, and it is actually lower in week 1. How-
ever, from week 3 to week 6, the experiments are more efficient than the simula-
tions.
These findings beg the question of why the simulated data of the T -treatment com-
pares so poorly to that of the human subjects in the Theft sessions. To answer this
question, I return to the experiments and examine subject behavior in more detail.
Because I have access to complete data on the flow of goods to and from experimen-
tal subjects and their expressed thoughts and intentions (in the form of chat room
transcripts), I have a clear view of their behavior as it develops in real-time.
As the experimental sessions unfolded, it became clear that human subjects dis-
played ingenuity of which the model’s agents were constitutionally incapable (they
are limited by the foresight of their modeler). Subjects learned quickly that while the
ability to take goods from other subjects allowed them to steal, it also provided them
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an additional means of exchange. If I take from you with your consent and you take
from me with my consent, this is economically equivalent to my actively giving you
something in return for something that you give me, and this is precisely the arrange-
ment that a number of the experimental sessions agree upon. In five of the six sessions
I observe the emergence a property convention that permits mutual taking with the
same specific content. The convention is embodied in the following chat transcript
segments, each from a different session:
In each of these transcript selections the content of the property convention is clear
and specific: subjects agree first to consume the goods they have produced to the best
of their abilities by placing them into their homes and only then to allow the others to
take whatever is leftover in their fields in order to meet their own needs.
Person 7>: heres what to do
Person 7>: only take from other people’s fields, not houses
Person 7>: whatever is in the house at the end of the round is what you make money off
Person 7>: so don’t jack other people’s house stuff, just fields, and at the end of the round
Person 7>: feel me?
Person 1>: yeah, but you can jack from the fields too
Person 7>: yeah thats what I’m saying
Person 7>: jack from the fields
Person 7>: then everyone can still make profit from the houses
Person 6>: #1, can i steal 9 reds?
Person 5>: #2 can i take 5 blue?
Person 5>: #1?
Person 1>: take from my domino if you need red
(. . .)
Person 8>: so now that we’ve agreed to not steal from each other
Person 7>: can we take from dominos?
Person 6>: ok can we take form dominos now?
Person 1>: yeah, take just from dominos, not houses
Person 5>: take from other people’s dominoes at THE END
Person 6>: maybe we should have a “grace” period
Person 6>: like the first 40 seconds don’t take from anybody but yourself
Person 6>: then the last 20 seconds, use the left overs
Person 5>: the fields are fairgame, lets decide on that from now on, nobody takes ANYTHING from
a house, if you have stuff to share you can put it in your field
Person 5>: your field is your yard sale lol
Person 4>: lets say after 30 seconds go by though
(. . .)
Person 4>: WE SAID THE FIELDS ARE FAIR GAME AFTER LIKE. . . 20 SECONDS
Person 7>: maybe people should keep their extra on the field and not in their house, and people can
take from that?
Person 3>: that works better for you
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Person 2>: that’s a good idea
Person 4>: good idea
Person 2>: then we won’t be stealing from each other
Person 7>: so if you have a whole bunch of red or blue you don’t need, move it to the field so people
can take it
Person 4>: i need red. put in field if you don’t need it
Person 5>: i think ppl need to stop pulling from the houses
Person 3>: k
Person 1>: lets try not moving stuff
Person 2>: only add what u need
Person 3>: add from just the fields?
Person 5>: ya
Human subjects innovate on their ability to unilaterally take goods from other
individuals’ homes and fields by adapting the social meaning of “taking” to their cir-
cumstances. Rather than treating all takings as malicious violations of property wor-
thy of rebuke and retaliation, subjects come to agree that some takings (particularly
those that occur after autarkic consumption has been optimized and explicit trade
agreements have been completed) are not actually violations of property at all.13
By altering the social meaning of property to permit some types of unilateral tak-
ing, subjects in the Theft treatment are able to achieve unexpectedly high efficiency.
On the other hand, my T -model agents are concerned only with the act of taking
goods or having goods taken from them when making their decisions. The fact that
agents in my simulations do not admit the possibility of steal-trading is likely the
reason that they do not achieve equivalently high levels of efficiency. With this fact
in mind, I develop a third simulation model that permits agents to engage in steal-
trading.
6 Steal-trading model
I extend the T -model with a variation called the ST-model (for steal-trading). In addi-
tion to stealing from and trading with one another, ST agents may also consensually
take unused goods from other agents’ homes after the initial consumption and ex-
change period. Steal-trading agents respect other agents’ claims to goods in their
“houses”, but they consider goods that are leftover in the fields to be “fair game”.
This additional behavior reflects the innovative convention that emerged in the exper-
iments reported above; by choosing to engage in steal-trading, agents may eliminate
wasteful theft and achieve efficiency on par with human subjects.
13That this interpretation constitutes a conscious and radical alteration of subjects’ initial views on prop-
erty in this environment is evidenced by the vocal reaction to early unilateral takings in the chat transcripts.
For example, by period 4 of Session 5, one subject has already instructed his counterparts to “stop stealing”
and “JUST LEAVE EVERYONES STUFF ALONE”. In Session 6 a subject laments “everyone just steals
it all from everyone else how pointless”. But later in both of these sessions, subjects agree that taking is
only a problem when goods are moved from houses. Some takings aren’t pointless at all.
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6.1 The mechanics of steal-trading
After agents produce, steal, consume and trade, but before they update their learning
rules and record their data for the next period, I introduce the possibility of steal-
trading. Only those agents that have a positive probability of theft and are also willing
to trade will attempt to steal trade. Since not all agents are willing to steal or trade
and since these variables change with experience, I merely provide access to the
convention, and there is no guarantee that it will be adopted. Agents that possess
unconsumed goods search the set of other agents to determine which other agent
has the highest amount of whichever good they are presently wasting the least. The
intuition is that an agent steal trades with those agents that can best help it satisfy its
preferences, given the set of goods it presently possess. If an agent is wasting a larger
amount of red than blue, then the agent needs more blue, so it takes from the agent
who has the largest amount of leftover blue.
A steal trading agent that has selected a target takes all of the target agent’s uncon-
sumed goods and consumes them according to its preferences. If unconsumed goods
remain, other steal-trading agents may later take them as part of a second coopera-
tive taking. Furthermore, since steal-trading is simply a second means of exchange,
any agent presently unwilling to trade that is party to a steal trade, becomes willing
to trade in the next period. Furthermore, if neither thief nor target engaged in trade
in the present period, the probability that they trade in the future increases and their
probabilities of theft decrease. Thus, both steal-trading and trading can ward off theft
and crowd out its detrimental effects.
6.2 ST treatments—results
I perform 1800 simulations under the ST-model with each of the six parameterizations
used for the T and No-T models. Table 5 displays average efficiency and special-
ization for each ST parameterization. I group the 1800 simulations for the 1515ST
parameterization into six sets of 300 sessions sorted by final period efficiency, and
Fig. 3 plots average efficiency by week, and average specialization by day for each of
the six groups. Note that in all but the two least efficient groups, efficiency is positive
by the end of the session and generally increasing in time.
Furthermore, respect for property is extremely strong under the ST-model. Ta-
ble 6 shows the number of sessions in each parameterization of the ST-model with
perfect, strong, and weak respect for property in week 6. More than 70% of these
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Fig. 3 Average efficiency by week and rate of specialization by day—1515ST treatment
simulations yield perfect respect for property, and on average nearly 95% of sessions
respect property at least weakly. The failure of agents to in the T -model to overcome
theft in order to reap the gains from trade appears to have been solved by the im-
position of the potential for steal-trading. I now compare the ST-model data to the
human subject data of the Theft treatment. If my observations from the experiments
about the importance of steal-trading are accurate, then the new simulation should be
indistinguishable from the Theft experiments.
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Table 6 Strength of respect for property ST-model (week 6)—number of sessions with perfect, strong,
and weak property
Treatment 1015ST 1020ST 1515ST 1520ST 2015ST 2020ST
Perfect (0%) 1338 1345 1305 1373 1292 1303
(74.33%) (74.72%) (72.5%) (76.28%) (71.78%) (72.39%)
Strong (<10%) 306 304 318 273 328 323
(17%) (16.89%) (17.67%) (15.17%) (18.22%) (17.94%)
Weak (<20%) 69 64 81 71 74 68
(3.83%) (3.56%) (4.5%) (3.94%) (4.11%) (3.78%)
Total 1713 1713 1704 1717 1694 1694
(95.17%) (95.17%) (94.67%) (95.39%) (94.11%) (94.11%)
Finding 5 The null hypothesis of equal mean efficiency of the Theft experiments and
all ST-model parameterizations cannot be rejected in weeks 3 and 6.
Table 7 displays bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for average efficiency in
100,000 random samples of six simulation runs each, for all parameterizations, and
compares those intervals to the experimental means from each week of the Theft
treatment. After week 2, mean efficiency from the Theft experiments falls within the
confidence interval for all parameterizations. Thus it appears that the introduction
of steal-trading has solved the problems of the T -model. Furthermore, unreported
confidence intervals suggest that, like the Theft experiments, the ST-model is indis-
tinguishable from the CSW experiments with exogenous property protection after
week 1.
By creating a subset of takings that are not interpreted as theft, agents are able
to overcome the temptation of stealing to develop specialization and trade. Thus,
it can be argued on the basis of these data that a lack of property protection is in-
sufficient to diminish the productive power of a two-good economy populated with
boundedly-rational agents. Because the absence of property permits additional means
of exchanging (via steal-trading), subjects and agents are able to eliminate the threat
of rampant, costless theft despite their inability to directly protect their goods. If trade
and steal trading have some probability of crowding out theft, then high levels of ef-
ficiency can attain.
7 Summary and discussion
In Kimbrough agents were created that accurately reproduce the patterns of human
behavior in CSWs experimental environment. Here, I extend the agent-based model
to a new environment in which the computer program no longer enforces property
rights over goods. This model, called the T -model, maintains all features and rules
of the original model, but it adds the ability of agents to steal from one another. The
T-model yields a sharp decrease in efficiency relative to the original model and also
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escalates uncontrollably—in fact only 5% of simulation runs display even weak re-
spect for property. Because the validity of the model depends on its ability to make
predictions about behavior in a novel environment, the results of the T -model consti-
tute predictions for a new set of human experiments employing the same institutional
variation.
I perform the second set of experiments (the Theft treatment), and another bat-
tery of statistical tests rejects the hypotheses produced by the T -model. Not only are
the Theft sessions more efficient than the T -model simulations, they are also indistin-
guishable from the human experiments with fully-protected property. Human subjects
innovate to exploit a feature of the environment in a way that is impossible for the
computerized agents; eliminating exogenous property enforcement permits theft, but
it also permits cooperative taking, or steal-trading. The subjects develop a convention
that alters the social interpretation of some instances of theft and thereby define a
subset of unilateral takings that are permissible. In fact, 5 of 6 human sessions with
theft develop a steal-trading convention with the exact same content: goods in houses
(i.e. goods to be consumed) are inviolable, while goods in fields (i.e. wasted produc-
tion) are “fair game”. Thus imperfect property enforcement allows subjects a second
method of welfare-improving exchange.
I then create a third version of the agent-based model (the ST-model) that captures
the spirit and effects of this convention. When steal-trading of wasted (i.e. uncon-
sumed and untraded) goods is permitted and such steal-trading may offset the detri-
mental effects of theft, the ST-model agents once again replicate human experimental
behavior. Thus, a third iteration of the model has taken a hypothesis about human so-
cial conventions from the observed chat room behavior (which has the potential to
be mere cheap talk) and applied it effectively to create agents that mimic human sub-
jects. Statistical tests demonstrate that the model is now indistinguishable from both
the human Theft treatment and the original CSW experiments where theft is impossi-
ble. Boundedly-rational agents engage in welfare improving specialization and trade
despite the absence of exogenous property enforcement—so long as they employ the
appropriate convention. Importantly, when theft and steal-trading are impossible, the
steal-trading version of the agent-based model reduces to the original model with
perfect protection of property, and it still accurately predicts human behavior in the
CSW experiments.
Human subject experiments and agent-based models both offer unique views into
the processes of economic behavior. Whereas field data on economic systems must
be captured in a series of snapshots at various instants throughout a process, both
computerized human-subject experiments and simulations allow one to observe the
evolution of an economy as it happens. This paper combines the power of the two
methods by extracting (or hypothesizing) rules of behavior for simulated agents from
observed behavior in the lab.
Whereas Kimbrough derived behavioral rules for individual agents from the ac-
tions of lone experimental subjects, this paper extracts an economy-wide property
convention to supplement individuals’ rules. Respect for property emerges as a con-
vention when subjects make clear the gains from trade, express to others that unilat-
eral takings will only harm their ability to engage in mutually beneficial exchange,
and then act in accordance with their stated views. Human groups develop property
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as part of a process that takes advantage of what Grotius calls our inherent “socia-
bleness” (Buckle 1991). Subjects in the Theft treatment employ their sociableness to
develop a steal-trading convention that allows them to overcome the incentives for
theft and to reap the gains from trade, and it is clear that computerized agents with-
out this social inclination cannot discover such conventions independently. However,
when this aspect of human sociableness is imported into the behavioral repertoire of
boundedly-rational agents that learn incrementally to specialize, trade, and respect
the possessions of others, those agents become indistinguishable from human actors
in the same environment.
In that sense, the model is successful because it abstracts from the social aspect
of exchange in order to capture the incremental process by which property conven-
tions spread across a population as trade (in the form of both barter and steal-trading)
crowds out theft. On the other hand, the model highlights the potential limitations of
an agent-based approach to relatively open-ended social problems. Key to the sub-
jects’ discovery of steal-trading was their ability to build consensus on the interpre-
tation, or social meaning, of the act of taking goods in various contexts. One way
to move closer to an accurate decision model would be to create agents that bargain
over and converge to an interpretation of various kinds of takings, but even in such a
complex model, the possibility remains that agents would be unable to predict human
behavior because the set of possible interpretations must be specified ahead of time.
Instead, one should view the method herein as providing a means of testing postulates
about what drives the experimental results.
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